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Cognitive mental space as the product of active sensing
We tend to think of buildings as permanent
structures with more or less static properties.
In spatial representation, the diagram of the
floor plan shows space as a void encased in
solid or porous boundaries. In the real world,
the body of architecture and the solidity of
materials generate a sense of stability, or
even finality. This is one way of thinking
about space.
Another way is to embrace the notion of
living in the state of impermanence rather
than one of finality. This concept is expressed
by philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1958) and
this research moves away from a static
spatial model towards a dynamic
environmental one that centres on sensing.
The dynamic spatial model doesn’t refer directly to the
physicality of space but to what phenomenologists
such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945) refer to as the
lived space of embodied experiences. Mark Johnson
(2007) explains this further: ‘meaning is grounded in
bodily experiences […] Bodily experiences occur
through sensing and through sensing we become
conscious of qualities, information and patterns in our
environment.’
We perceive our environment through our senses but
we are not simply passive recipients. Our senses
actively seek information in our surroundings. The
reference of senses as active seeking mechanisms
comes from ecological psychology and the work of
James J. Gibson (1966).
The ecological perspective indicates that our
experience of spaces is relational. Gibson explains that
the environment ‘[…] does not exist in or of itself. It
exists only in relation to the being whose environment
it is.’ This means that the meaningful environment of
the lived space is relative to each of us as the subject
of perception. Even though the location and design of
a space, activities within it and the culture in which it
exists will foster shared experiences, each of us will
have a unique experience.
Gibson (1986) also reminds us that we are sentient
and animate, we are ‘perceivers of the environment as
well as behavers in the environment’. We don’t exist
independently from one another. The behaviour of
one person will have an impact on the perception of
another and Henri Lefebvre (1974) explains that we
situate ourselves in space as active participants: ‘the
search for information about things through skin
contact, through feeling, through caresses, relies on
the use of subtle energies.’ Through participation,
through movement, gestures and activities, we also
generate sensory space.
Therefore, we can conclude that we develop our
knowledge of the world through active sensing and
that active sensing is exploratory, participatory and
generative.
Sensory space is not one homogeneous entity. As we move
through space and our senses actively seek information, the
information filters into consciousness and gradually we
perceive space as a series of arrivals into and departures
from nested sensory territories, an experience mediated by
perceptual thresholds.
Perceptual thresholds are transitions into sensory
environments. Sometimes they’re mediated by physical
elements in space such as doorways, or they belong to the
domain of surfaceless space, a term coined by
phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (2011). Perceptual
thresholds in surfaceless space include the transition from
light to dark or noisy to quiet.
When our senses actively seek information we form mental
impressions. Malnar and Vodvarka (2004) explain that we
do not respond directly to our real environment but to
mental impressions of it and in perceptual psychology,
Rudolf Arnheim (1983 cited in Malnar and Vodvarka 1992)
explains that as we pass through a space, we pick up
information through a myriad of mental impressions, which
we integrate together automatically to form a total
perceptual image. It is from this total perceptual image that
we develop a mental map of our environment.
Cognition is defined as the mental action or process of
acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought,
experience and the senses. Therefore the notion of
impressions is important because it denotes that a small
detail is enough for cognition to occur.
According to psychologists Stephen and Rachel Kaplan
(1981) environmental cognition develops through
experience and familiarity and that we also look for traces
of familiarity in less familiar environments. They explain
that familiarity with an environment is essential
information about that environment already stored in the
head and as familiarity develops we become less
dependent on information from the environment.
Our mental map is the product of patterns of stored
information generated through active sensing. Malnar and
Vodvarka (2004) explain that this process is highly complex
and involves all senses as well as locational accuracy. In
Western culture, we often privilege vision but other senses,
the ability to understand our surroundings through touch,
smell or sound also play a critical role in the development of
environmental cognition.
Placemaking writer Tony Hiss (1990) talks about
‘simultaneous perception’, ‘[…] a general awareness of a
great many different things at once: sight, sounds, smells,
and the sensation of touch and balance, as well as thoughts
and feelings […] we develop mental images through cross-
sensory, or multi-sensory, patterns of information, not only
about the physical environment but also about relations
between people.’ Therefore, simultaneous perception is the
ability to perceive many sensory impressions at the same
time to form mental images. `
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Interpretation of Gibson’s (1966) perceptual systems classification table:
(Malnar and Vodvarka 2004)
• Visual system - stimuli: light; information through: surfaces and forms
• Smell-taste system – stimuli: air; information through: odour and flavour
• Auditory system – stimuli: vibrations in the air; information through: sound
• Basic-orienting system – stimuli: gravitation towards and kinaesthesia; 
information through: movement
• Haptic system – stimuli: skin; information through: touch
Cognitive Mental Map functional properties (Kaplan 1981)
• Generality: the model extracts similarities and ignores temporary situations and 
variations in environmental configurations. 
• Economy: the model simplifies and codes the information for speedy and reliable 
access.
• Connectedness: the model uses a series of symbols to identify known points and 
establish connections for the map to read as continuous. 
• Simplicity: unnecessary information is discarded.
• Essence: critical stereotypical information is retained. 
• Directness: experiences are arranged into categories.
• Unity: a clear organisation of information against its background.
Prototype map to illustrates my cognitive mental map of level 2 at the Royal Festival Hall.
Active sensing is something we do everyday, it is a natural
process that enables us to make sense of our environment.
We actively seek information through sensory impressions
but we also participate and may even leave our own
sensory impressions behind, as this image illustrates: an in-
between departures and arrivals.
Active sensing is complex and dynamic and difficult to grasp
in its totality. Yet this research shows that it is possible to
develop a phenomenological methodology that facilitates
the documentation and interpretation of sensory
impressions, and to translate them into a mental map that
illustrates how a space resonates with our senses.
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